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Law and Power
Paul Sayre*
CASTOR AND POLLUX: YOU CAN'T HAVE EITHER SEPARATELY
Of course, Castor and Pollux are in the heavens as stars. But
this is a later naming. They were well known to the Romans as
gods and we still find temples dedicated to them. A striking
thing, however, is that they seem to have no separate person-
alities whatever. Literally, you never find one without the other.
It is this kind of literal and complete union that we ascribe
to law and morals, and, for that matter, law and power. Neither
one of this foursome can justly appear separately, although, of
course, they do in our usual use of language, and most people
think of them as separate. But is this true? Do we not come
closest to the strange phenomenon that we call law by thinking
of law as action? Of course, no brief definition is satisfactory in
every way. We merely say that this way of looking at things
comes closer than any other brief statement to presenting the
crucial characteristics of law. We find that legal rights always
have some kind of action as the starting point. Some one gets
punched in the nose, or he delivers the deed, or he signs the con-
tract, or perhaps he refuses to do some particular act. In any
case, it is his action that gives rise to claims against him by
others, or claims by him against them.
Of course, one can give what seem to be exceptions to this.
Thus an act may result in new liabilities in another in which it
seems no action at all was undertaken. But this is also an indica-
tion of action, or perhaps his failure to protest is a kind of non-
action. Of course, nonaction may involve more significant action
than action itself. A voluntary act always involves morals in
our view. Also, nonaction does if it is voluntary. For our pur-
poses this decision, to do or not to do a responsible act, is an
effect of moral judgment. It is a moral act and hence a part of
morals in the most vital sense. Consequently, we think of law
with morals, not law and morals.
Of course, in another sense, there is a vast field of action that
is not directly controlled by law. One can plan certain things or
*Professor of Law, University of Iowa.
[756]
LAW AND POWER
not on his farm without future regulation. He has reasonable
freedom of locomotion in traveling about as he thinks best, and,
in this country at least, this freedom is not restrained. This
activity, unregulated in a significant sense by law, we call power.
Some would call it freedom, or individual rights, or some other
name. We also speak of law and power rather than law with
power, because a considerable area of our activity is covered by
power uncontrolled by the state; in a way there is a correspond-
ence in law and morals, since morals may apply where you don't
have legal regulations. We prefer, however, to speak of law with
morals where the law operates, and power with morals where
these are separate from legal regulations. We also speak of law
and power, since this covers the area outside the reasonable re-
straints of law (power) in a fairly separate sense from the area
covered by legal regulation. Morals, however, go to the quality
of action, and hence we speak only of law with morals and then
(separately) power with morals. There is, at least, a mistaken
emphasis when we think of activity controlled by the law in a
totally separate field from activity controlled by the individual
rights and power of the person himself. It is so easy for one to
think that he runs his own factory, subject only to certain laws
and regulations of the state, while his income tax he concedes is
handled by state law to which he is subject. We sometimes fail
to give conscious recognition to the indirect, if not direct, impor-
tance of both individual power and state law in delimiting each
other. Thus, in a neighborhood where refuse is kept off the
streets, ashes and garbage efficiently handled by other means,
there is no occasion for state law to intrude. Yet if these things
are not done voluntarily, as in some slum neighborhoods, the
very things that are handled unobtrusively and with apparent
freedom in a well-managed neighborhood will come to endanger
health and minimum standards of public order in some congested
neighborhoods, so that laws under the police power must be used
to protect the citizens themselves. There is no such thing as lib-
erty in the sense of abdication of all part in community life with
deterioration of minimum standards of living for everyone. Of
course, it is better and usually more successful for individuals
freely to carry us to higher standards of living; but if they stead-
fastly insist on degradation and destruction both for themselves
and for others, then in the name of self-preservation some public
action must be taken.
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It is in this sense that we say that the power of the individ-
ual, though separate if he exercises it wisely, is not separate in
the sense of arrogant and crucial destruction of everything. The
individual's power exercised under the law is not separate from
the part regulated by the law. Perhaps even more important
in the vast field of apparently individual action is our system of
private rights and private property. Usually private property is
the best way to insure high quality of living and high perform-
ance, rather than to depend on the blighting effect of putting
everything under the control of governmental bureaucracy. But
there is no license to do wrong to anybody anywhere. There is a
periphery of state action which is exercised or not in some meas-
ure according to the vigor and merit of private action and per-
sonal power. We can put it this way: morals are a necessary
part of the law where the law operates and, of course, perhaps
more important where they are individual and the law does not
directly operate. Some personal rights and power are happily
present even under legal regulations, and of course, they are
dominantly, almost exclusively present in the vast field we have
outside of legal regulation. But this presupposes the voluntary
and even vigorous cooperation of persons in their moral duties
and their efficient activities in this field of personal power and
happily free from state intrusion. We rely upon education, re-
ligion, various cultural activities to keep up the high standards
of our free people. But we must recall again the true aphorism,
that eternal vigilance is the price of liberty, meaning not only
eternal vigilance of tyrants on the outside, but also eternal vigi-
lance against our own laziness, or indifference to duty within the
mighty power of which we are so proud and with which we can
do so much more than state control can do if only we are worthy
of these opportunities. Law and power, then, are not separate
within the separate areas. There is a little of the other in each
area. But perhaps more sweepingly important is that the vast
area of power with individual rights, as we happily think of it,
is not separate from the more limited field of legal regulation.
Each area in a sense makes the other area possible. They are
not eternally separate and should not have a narrow jealousy
based on their apparent separation. The vigorous life of each
is found in vigorous living in both areas, with the eternal moral
consciousness that the soldier cannot throw down his arms and
go home in the presence of the enemy. All of us, whether in free
activity or somewhat regulated by the law, must continue to do
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our part with more than perfunctory activity. Even our mag-
nificent use of modern regulation with dominant rights and
power in the individual will not make glorious success from
decadence. We justly speak of our government and our laws as
expressing incidental devices which we as citizens use in the
masterly efforts of our own accomplishment.
Perhaps in more technical terms this means that we do not
think of the law in an artificial sense of a totally separate system.
And the same goes for what we think of as our free exercise of
power. The laws lose their meaning if we do not see that they
are incident to individual activity; and individual activity may
tragically slip into mere sloth or selfishness and ridiculous in-
efficiency if it does not renew its own vigor and prevent the
encroachment of legal control by the magnificent exercise of its
own job and its own powers.
VALUES IN LIVING
Most statements of value are by philosophers, not judges or
businessmen or people in other walks of life. They state values
in terms of norms, and they fix the content of the value in
logical terms. Thus, many state the object of effort is hap-
piness, and then they proceed to prove (or think they prove)
that happiness as a matter of logical reasoning is the best object
of human effort. But these rules or norms often have only vague
relation to the facts, yet the proof of their merit relies on an
assumption of factual reality for the accuracy of these norms.
This, it seems, along with other difficulties, tends to an assump-
tion of truth on a purely logical basis in terms of abstractions,
without careful checking of these abstractions to see if the facts
justify them: in other words, to see if they are truthful, whether
in actual experience of living or in a truthful statement of either
abstractions or facts that have not been experienced. And per-
haps most of the professional philosophers who have worked
on abstract norms alone as a basis for their system of values
have been men who dealt in positivism or in terms of experience
in what they call an "objective" character. They do not deal with
ideas as facts, and especially they do not deal with moral ideas.
They speak largely in terms of the present psychology and for
that matter psychiatry also, in which moral ideas are omitted.
All is stated in terms of instinct or impulses, and these in turn
along with variations of mental activity are put objectively, in
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terms of behavior patterns, in which they feel there is no room
for moral opinion in reaching results.
Our approach is quite different. We do not seek to construct
a logical system at all. We think of law and conduct as a way
of walking, not a way of talking. Thus we define value as that
which furthers worthy living. We also define evil as an in-
sufficiency of the Good. Consequently, a particular law or moral
practice may further the Good in some indirect or other sense,
although it seems to be helping evil. What we justly call evil
may well have some consequences that further the Good. And
of course, incident to this, humans cannot hope to have a very
truthful knowledge of all the consequences of particular laws
or acts. We hold fast, however, to our idea of action as the
criterion of law, and the idea of action also as the criterion of
value and the Good, and truth. Indeed, our whole thought is in
terms of action, and our conclusions are tested by their conse-
quences in action. This in turn gives us the same approach and,
it might be said, the same basic tests for both law and individual
conduct.
Nearly all the great philosophers have talked about the Good
as the end of life in some sense. Plato seemed to think it was
reality, and Aristotle thought it was the promotion of good
conduct by actual people, with the understanding that justice in
the elevated sense and the Good as an ultimate desideratum
could be thought of interchangeably.
We think at least that the important difference between all
statements of the Good in various philosophical systems of the
past and our own view is that we divide up the Good, just for
purposes of striving for them and talking about them so that
we can more accurately fix on what they mean while others have
a single definition of the Good, such as reality or good conduct.
We think of the Good as divided into seven parts for these pur-
poses only. Quite differently, we think the Good may well be
divided under different circumstances with different headings
and that reasonable flexibility in new interpretations is to be
both expected and desired. We also think that the Good tran-
scends the power of human description. It is an idea toward
which men can work in fuller understanding; but could not hope
to achieve completely. For these limited purposes then we sug-
gest the following seven divisions:
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(1) Liberty (change)
(2) Equality (justice)
(3) Self-realization for everything
(4) Beauty (truth, self-restraint)
(5) Particular accomplishment
(6) A dynamic element with respect to all phases of th(
Good, which means that the several parts also involve
courageous struggle.
(7) Creative conscience or consciousness as it may be de-
fined, including the over-all element of redeeming love.
(It is understood that the last two are implicit in all the
others).
We must say at once that while seven bases for evaluating
court decisions and personal conduct (by law and power), begin-
ning with personal judgment, include always and everywhere
the human conscience to guide us to the Good. But we do not
end with this subjective approach. We deal with presuppositions
and jural postulates in our way of living, and we think of our
subjective tests (the seven just g.iven) as a means of evaluating
these objective ways of life. For instance, by rather general
consent, matters of health and safety are important interests in
the law. Security of the individual against needless uncertain-
ties is also a reasonable interest of the law. We would want to
further all legal interests to secure both a vigorous and rich life
for everyone, but we would evaluate the important and the rea-
sonable expectation of accomplishment through enforcing these
legal interests when we consider them morally in terms of the
seven phases of the Good we have mentioned. In a word, we do
ultimately pursue the Good, and it is in terms of the Good that
we desire to use and strengthen particular legal interests. Thus,
not even health is an ultimate end of life. We would not favor
health if it led to degradation in a particular case through
ignoring the more immediate needs of freedom if these would
lead to the Good in the richest, fullest sense, while health alone
under the particular circumstances would not.
Von Jhering was rather definitely the source of "legal in-
terests," though he did very little to develop it, and the use of
legal interests now is so greatly expanded beyond his pioneer
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work that the two hardly seem to be the same thing. The Ger-
mans have been the developers of legal interests on the technical
side, though in the application doctrine as a part of judicial and
legal technique to the problems of the law, Roscoe Pound in this
country has been by far the dominant figure. The German
interessen has developed philosophically, both as an interpreta-
tion of individual rights and of general policy in a social, po-
litical, or economic sense. Von Jhering himself merely made a
legal interest a somewhat expanded presentation of a legal rule,
so that we considered law to be not only the rule but its fair
implications and periphery. This would be our view also. Quite
definitely we think the more extensive interpretation of legal
interests-what is often called social interests-should be cov-
ered by our seven parts of the Good. Among the Germans of
recent years, there are those who roughly adhere to this view
of Von Jhering and there are others who include these general
interpretations of public policy. We think we are the only ones
who proceed on a frankly ethical basis including judgments for
the future in both deciding legal rules for the future and fixing
upon personal conduct, especially in view of changing conditions
of both law and morals from time to time.
This construction gets us into some trouble, but then we think
law and life are one, both legal and ethical; or, if you like, we
think all life is one, that part of life regulated by the law, and
that part which we often call power as against law. In this
second part of power, we feel the pressure of moral values even
more strongly than under legal restraints, since the individual
has the power to do good or evil in this field.
In a word, the field of individual morals or power, which
the law at least directly does not restrain, is peculiarly dear
to us. There we have opportunity for individual growth and
individual interpretation that makes for manhood and character,
where regulation at every turn tends to crush and debase a
person. For instance, what if the state planned all the houses
in some city, as it often does? Even in our capitalistic countries,
these new subdivisions constructing an entire city complete with
stores, schools, churches, as well as homes and other facilities,
do not involve the individual planning of each home owner, ex-
cept in rather minor variations that are largely incidental to
the main plan. But generally, in our country it is still possible
for a young couple to save their money for years, while they are
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thinking and planning together to build their own home eventual-
ly. When that home is built, both husband and wife have gained
strength and dignity and, no doubt, real development of artistic
skills in creating that home themselves. Of course, one must
count over against this the work of the architect and the interior
decorator and others. Granting this, however, there is a net vigor
and independent power for a great number of home owners who
put themselves into their homes in many ways. Surely, the econ-
omies and the other advantages of mass production must go hand
in hand with the real good of the individual, and not in a crass
indefiniteness to whether he grows or becomes a mere auto-
maton which is dehumanized and debased. Depend upon it, if
we crush the individual, this grandiose social structure will
collapse and perhaps then we will indeed have tragedy of the
ancient Greek sort: the individual never will rise again and
there never can be life at all that is worthy of the name.
It seems that postulates should go particularly with the claim
of the plaintiff. They are often called "postulates of the time
and place" or "postulates of civilization." They are labels for
general practices in an objective sense that people in our times
can fairly rely on incident to their legal rights and their way
of life. Like legal interests, they go beyond legal rules, but they
are more extensive and perhaps less definite than legal inter-
ests of civilization in the German interessen of Heck, but they go
beyond our legal view of interests, and while they are less ex-
tensive than our seven divisions of the Good they introduce an
objective test for the law, rather than the subjective ethical
approach of the Good. We suggest that they go particularly with
the plaintiff, because in bringing his suit, he alleges he is in-
jured according to some test or some standard. Thus, he may
feel that he is injured in the breaking of a particular rule of
law, or in his further rights under a legal interest, or in the
violation of these more general objective phases of the legal
order, mainly the legal postulates of the time and place. On
the other hand, legal assumptions go more directly to the de-
fendant's position like legal postulates that set forth the legal
order which applies to both plaintiff and defendant and all
people. But the assumptions seem by implication and the fair
meaning of that word to carry the notion of what the defendant
can use of that broader interpretation to justify his position.
We would suggest the following tentative elements for the postu-
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lates and the assumptions, but, as in other interests, we would
not want these to become crystallized as unchangeable without
any danger of introducing any real uncertainty in the law. We
are safe in leaving our statements open to reinterpretation later.
POSTULATES
1. Truth will be respected in the sense of not unjustly de-
ceiving people to their injury.
2. A common good with the social side of individual interests
shall be furthered in every practical and just way.
3. People should claim their individual rights only in the
sense of worthy development for the future and the dig-
nity of man.
ASSUMPTIONS
1. People will want to enforce their legal claims with the
least burden to others and in a spirit of true fraternity.
2. Whether in personal injuries or in the breaching of agree-
ments, defendant will want to restore the actual loss, so
that the claimant will not suffer because of the wrong-
doing of the defendant.
3. The interests of persons, whether litigants or not, should
be before the court, even though they are not put in issue
by either plaintiff or defendant, if they bear on the issue
before the court and are appropriate for decision at that
time.
By power we mean the field of voluntary action not directly
controlled by law. Here there are usually conflicting interests
of some kind, though in large measure it may be possible to
satisfy apparent conflicts with substantial fulfillment of the de-
sires of both. In the ownership of land, for instance, the air-
planes can generally traverse priority on land without inter-
fering with the real enjoyment of the owner. The owner in turn
can develop his land as fully as he likes, without requiring that
airplanes should keep out of his air space. But there come points
of conflict where, for instance, the airplane flies too close to
the ground or drops things from the sky to injure those on the
land. On the other hand, the landowner can erect unnecessary
building apparatus to interfere with air transport, or can send
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up flame or gases to make air travel hazardous. Kant might
say that the reasonable self-assertion of the airplane is unlimited
except by the reasonble self-assertion of the landowner or per-
haps protected with other legal interests. But this doctrine of
Kantian free self-assertion in transcendental philosophy or the
more usual form in the law of conflicting legal interests is surely
superficial and insufficient. The claims of both contestants may
be wrong and lead to evil results. Thus you may not serve the
Good at all, although you do make a good job of adjusting these
actual conflicts between the plaintiff and defendant. The fur-
therance of the Good may be something that neither party has
requested and neither party would favor. The claims of both
parties may not be well chosen to advance the Good. Therefore,
the theory of legal interests in the law is usually qualified by
cultural standards in which legal interests of individuals also
further the advantage of society. Legal postulates of the time
and place and assumptions or other qualifications of claims may
further be used to interpret and justify one legal claim as against
the other.
But even this second advance, which roughly is as far as legal
theory goes now, is surely not enough in our approach and not
enough for the needs of the law. Essentially it interprets every-
thing in terms of present culture and present experience, which
of course in some degree is always past experience and past cul-
ture. The present is instantly the past as soon as you say "pres-
ent" or perhaps sooner still as soon as the idea has passed,
though it was not even spoken. We have then the problem of
serving the Good through law by giving the best effects we can
to the claims of both litigants. But in this must be realized the
experience of the past. This includes a theory of legal interests,
legal postulates, and legal assumptions. This means not only
the reasonable expectancies (often fixed rules of law) and the
cultural values of the past, but the ethical insights (different
views of the Good). This last may mean pure speculation about
the future which never was on land or sea.
Within the scope of the law, it is usual to talk legal inter-
ests, legal postulates, and legal assumptions. Of course, many
other paraphernalia are used in different ways, but these three
at least are rather generally employed, and they are ones that
suit our purposes. Also, let us say at once that we think ethics
is a necessary part of the law, at least to this extent: the parties
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themselves must choose whether they will do an act involving a
liability, and the judges must choose in preferring one side
against the other. In making these choices a moral judgment
necessarily is involved. Thus, we would never favor law and
morals, but always law with morals, if we were to separate them
at all. Still more strange, perhaps, we take the view that there
is no great difference between law and morals or law and power
generally. For instance, the great Petrazycki makes a basic point
that morals are directed to the individual, while law is always
bilateral. Even if it is criminal law, it is still bilateral because
it is between the citizen and the state, while rules of law always
involve at least two persons, actual or artificial if there is to be
a lawsuit at all, or if there are to be rights and duties in any
legal situation. But we feel that this is artifical in its minuteness.
It makes distinctions that do not exist. The difference between
ethics apart from conduct of legal restraint, and conduct within
elements of legal liability, is one of degree or aspect rather than
kind. Thus, very much to his honor we think Petrazycki feels
there are legal values in our duties to animals and our duties in
the field of manners, although these do not fit his definition.
One would surely think of them technically in the field of non-
law, or personal power, or legally non-regulated conduct. He
has to explain them a good deal to get them within his over-
all concept of law. True, indirectly there are elements of legal
liability from man's relations to animals and his relations from
manners uncovered by the law. Yet also they peculiarly fit the
non-legal field. At once there is a question; it seems better to
talk of law and non-law as matters of degree or emphasis.
Happily also, this approach enables us to use substantially
the same analysis and the same nomenclature in both law and
general morals. It avoids the need for complete rethinking when
we have an account or a rule that does closely follow under both
headings.
It may be asked, how can we talk legal interests in a non-
legal field? Of course, we must change the analysis somewhat,
although still asserting their essential unity. In a non-legal field
it would be largely ethical and cultural interests, but there are
many matters in the legal field where we fairly have to consider
ethical and cultural interests as well as legal ones in the con-
ventional sense. The scope of individual action is greater in the
non-legal field, from the very fact that it is not clearly and
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significantly controlled by law. Many individual activities are
conceded to be in the non-legal field, which hardly, if ever, crop
up in the strictly legal field.
Wittgenstein has been greatly honored for his system of
stating norms that shall be logically accurate, without any pos-
sible exception to these statements. But we fear this atmosphere
of infallibility sometimes encourages error rather than prevents
it. Wittgenstein is very careful to state at the outset that he
assumes the facts justify the statement which is then considered
for its logical accuracy. Perhaps particularly in the interpreta-
tion of the subject and the predicate. But he assumes the truth
of these statements before he discusses their logical use at all.
The chief difficulty perhaps in philosophy is the truth of the
statement in view of the facts. Especially in the field of ethics,
statements are assumed in a normative sense, although they are
not true in a factual sense.
We think this is a serious fallacy in practice in most of
the well-known ethical systems. For instance, Kant begins, as-
suming only abstractions that are separate from the factual
world. Then, for instance, he takes up the question of punish-
ment and says that in abstract truth, the punishment must be
attributive, proportional to the offense. He points out that this
punishment in logic should be what is really needed in view of
the offense. Thus, any mercy in reducing the punishment would
be unjust to the criminal himself, since he needs exactly this
punishment for his own real advantage.
But this assumes the factual accuracy of Kant's abstract test
of the greatest free self-assertion in each, compatible with a like
right in others. Kant does not even discuss the workability of
this test in view of the facts that confront the judge and the
criminal.
It seems that practically all the other ethical thinkers fall
into this hazard to some degree. For instance, Duguit repudiates
ethics entirely for a basis for law, saying dogmatically that the
sole test for law is whether or not it furthers social solidarity.
That leaves out ethics or morals entirely, since social solidarity
may occur on an evil plane as well as a good one. Even the
classical thinkers like Plato and Aristotle postulate reality or
the just and the Good in such fixed abstractions that one does
not know their intended course for the law. This is inevitable
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because they do not, and perhaps cannot, give factual content
to their abstract tests. The worst offenders may be those in
modern times who state ethics and law in terms of happiness or
pleasure or utility. They glibly assume that one of those abstract
tests alone contains within it in daily application all the needed
tests for the good life. We don't think pleasure is a workable
test for any good result, but we certainly wouldn't think that
such a test would fit every possible case from the mere assertion
of this universal test alone.
Indeed, it often comes down to a "special pleading" in the
popular use of that phrase. For instance, Spencer and Bergson
based their philosophical approach on evolution in one form or
another. But they thereby assumed that their particular abstrac-
tions on the single test met the factual needs of all situations in
the field of law or ethics. They give no evidence for this. They
just assume that the facts will back up their pet abstraction,
and they ignore any questioning of this whatever.
Surely our approach is both more humble and more practical,
if nothing else. We give seven divisions of the Good, not just
one test. We say that the Good transcends all the seven so as
to give room for peripheral insights, and finally we assert
merely these seven as convenient labels for what will be ex-
pressed in the actual ethical judgments, based on the actual
problem on the facts. We can then collect what the judgments
are on that case, as we find them in the law reports. Then we
have agreements or differences on the results, although the par-
ticular norms and the particular interpretations of the facts may
differ.
It does seem that this method of ours is so different from
the recognized ethical systems of the past that we must begin
from our approach, and not from some futile restatement and
reargument of other approaches which cannot fairly justify or
overthrow our view, since they do not deal with the same methods
or problems at all.
We hope to use the seven divisions of the Good to test both
law and conduct by experience and by prior interpretations of
the Good, much as we build up the common law through judicial
decisions in which our view of trespass, for instance, is developed
from one decision to another. In keeping with this, we decide
whether there has been wrongdoing by court decision in which
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judges have taken part. They may each have different back-
grounds and different ethical or religious views, but they agree
on whether justice requires recovery against a wrongdoer in a
particular case of alleged trespass. Under our seven divisions
of the Good applied in actual court decisions, we would in time
have judicial decisions as to what equality, liberty, and the other
five meant in a particular case. This would give us agreements
in results even though judges differ in their private ethical and
religious views. It would enable us to build up standards under
our seven divisions of the Good which we could apply in the law
courts, and which individuals in private conduct could apply,
based for them on ethical writings and community practices
and individual opinions for matters of exercise and power not
directly controlled by the law.
This notion of Kant's that the criminal is entitled to his
punishment, if taken in an arbitrary sense, is one of the darkest
phases of his absolute idealism. Not only does it have the hazard
of abstractions that never touch the factual world at all, but it
has the added danger of thinking of punishment also in an ab-
stract way, in the sense that it is really disconnected from re-
form or correction or protection of society, or any other civilized
and decent view of punishment. Kant really does think to pretty
low levels in his notions of punishment. Punishment has many
ideas within it. To name three easy ones, it includes in most
common sense thought, first, punishment in the sense of cor-
rection or reeducation for useful living. Then would come pun-
ishment in the sense of confinement, so that the criminal is
prevented from doing further injuries to society, at least for
a while. And thirdly, it is punishment in the sense that because
of the burden of the punishment, he is deterred from committing
other criminal acts, in addition to the improvement of his char-
acter under the first element and in addition to his isolation
from society during his confinement, as we have noted in the
second element.
But there is a limit to everything. Punishment in the sense
of revenge, with a sadistic emphasis, would have a degrading
effect on respectable people who are supposed to run the country,
somewhat in the sense that slavery may work more injury on
the masters than it does on the slaves. But here we must watch
the limits of this approach. We would say that you can't punish
a criminal merely to reform him or to protect society or to
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change his future conduct. We would not approve punishment
unless there is some wrongdoing which is a just occasion for
action against the criminal. Up to this point we approve Kant's
distinctions. But granting he has done wrong for which there
is a particular punishment, then the interpretation of punish-
ment itself would be within the three elements we have just
mentioned.
This part of an approach to penology is very moderate. Thus,
you use medicine apart from punishment with a view to getting
a patient well, but you don't feed him medicine if he is not sick
in the first place. The element of repression is not punishment
to the extent that if he does these wrongful acts, we insist, as
it were, that he take the cure whether he wants to or not. We
would not so insist if he had not broken the law and incurred
the nonpenalty under the law.
This cure, as it were, which he must endure, is almost always
unpleasant and distasteful, although we trust not cruel. And this
repressive side of punishment, though aimed at reeducation and
protection of others in its effect, does bring us to a somewhat
separate element which is undoubtedly a part of handling things
by way of criminal procedure. This element is the deterrent
effect of the existence of criminal penalties for those who have
not yet broken the law, but might do so if it were not for the
penalties that would come to them.
But this separate element at once involves us in complica-
tions. Perhaps in most cases, and often very much to our sur-
prise, these published penalties do not deter crimes in others.
This unexpected result is perhaps for two reasons. First, as
so often happens, the criminal is not thinking of the penalties
at all when he commits the offense. He acts on immediate provo-
cation. Indeed, this is quite normal, both psychologically and
pragmatically for the usual human being. Secondly, he often
commits the offense in a kind of bland indifference to the penal-
ties. They do not deter him in the least, although he is fully con-
scious of them. Perhaps the final paradox is, that if the penalties
are extremely severe, they prove to have less rather than more
effect in deterring crime.
There is, for instance, a famous illustration that when the
common law hanged culprits for picking pockets of even a few
shillings, there was a kind of bravado among pickpockets to
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attend public hangings of convicted pickpockets and then pick
the pockets of those who attended. This is a part of the psycho-
logical folly of hoping to end crime by increasing the penalty.
At least much more important than the severity of the penalty
is the certainty of conviction.
What we have said is perhaps the bones of our approach to
the law. Others might call it the structure, but we eschew that
word "structure" because it reasonably holds connotations of a
system or organization of legal matter, and this is exactly what
we do not want to create or discuss. We take the popular phrase
for the law itself, namely, that law is a way of walking, not a
way of talking. Thus we can have ways of doing things, but not
a logical and analytical system which becomes a requirement in
itself, rather than in interpretation of actual conduct.
On the conduct side, however, perhaps the chief pitfall is in
judgments by judges or others showing what they think should
be done in judicial decision or personal conduct for the future,
as against judicial decision and personal conduct relative to
past experience, especially in the sense of existing culture and
general standards. This latter is what Comte substantially meant
by relativism, and he was fairly the originator of the relativistic
doctrine as well as the originator of the very term "sociology"
along with the basic methods and affirmations of that science.
"Tout est relativ; voild le suel principe absolu" was his famous
phrase. In this broad approach which has found rather exten-
sive use even in such great judges as Cardozo and Learned Hand,
we cannot join. Relativism in the sense of interpreting general
words-for instance, like "good moral character" as those words
are fairly understood in that situation at that time, is highly
conscientious and illustrative of judicial restraint, but it is not
sound practice. A judge and a person must do more than inter-
pret the mores around him. He must use the customs and the
culture of his time, but he must remember that his decisions
necessarily operate in the future. Thus the least he can do is to
strive for an interpretation worthy of this future and equal to
the work of this future, which necessarily must be somewhat
different from present and past culture and experience. This
is inevitable since in the factual world all facts are necessarily
different from each other, and the facts of the future are strik-
ingly different from the past. Thus the wisdom and the con-
science of the judge and of all human beings guiding their con-
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duct must dare to think for new situations (not just the past),
no matter how conscientiously they feel the interpretation of
the past is important in this fixing of the interpretation of the
future. They must use the culture and experience of the past as
they think it is wisely interpreted, but they must always re-
member that the future is necessarily different and hence there
must be some original, humble contribution of their own in all
these estimates, so as to meet the future adequately, which can
never be done by the past in a literal sense. And of course, we
remember, for these purposes and in sober fact that there is
only past and future. There is no present. What we call the
present is a special variety of the past, or perhaps a special and
limited guess of the immediate future. There is the old illustra-
tion: the moment you say "present," it is the past.
Perhaps we should add that this estimate of the future is
what gives dignity and honor to judges and men generally. It
goes to all our estimates and conduct of life. It is something
that the judge cannot abdicate and remain a man at all.
Confusion comes in this when Mr. Justice Holmes is some-
times called a relativist. But this in a very different sense, so
that it seems regrettable for statements to be made about him
in these terms at all. It is said that Holmes is a relativist be-
cause his legal and moral principles to be applied in the future
take account of the actual facts and situations that will be in-
volved. But this includes Holmes' own wise and brilliant needs
of the future, and it is all the better that he has in mind the
situations that will be involved and applies his ideas to specific
situations, avoiding the grave dangers of absolute abstractions.
But this is not the relativism of Comte or Cardozo or the gen-
erally accepted use of that term which we have discussed. This
is the very wise and daring thought for the future with the use
of the past which we so admire.
In using these devices of the law-rules, interests, postulates,
suppositions, divisions of the Good-we must practice eternal
vigilance. Our sixth division of the Good deals with a dynamic
element and, of course, there is a dynamic quality in the seventh
division with these inexpressible elements added to it. But they
do not guarantee action at all. A kind of slow degeneracy seems
to attack individuals as well as nations, almost as if a personal
devil were involved. The elusive quality of confident and humble
action in the face of failure and dangers may prove beyond the
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reach of some persons or some nation just for the moment or
just for a brief period. Perhaps under slightly different cir-
cumstances there would be ample courage and imagination. But
for the moment the best efforts of the best people seem futile to
bring them into effective action. They elude effort perhaps only
long enough to ruin hope of ultimate accomplishment. This is
enough to defeat what one might call the thousands or millions
of years of the past in building resources or capacities for fur-
ther human achievements. It seems at least that one whole course
of advance has been stopped and that any amount of effort
through any number of years has been futile.
This indescribable creativeness has slipped away and left
only the absence of life and the absence of achievement in all its
gloom and destruction. Everything we mention and every par-
ticle of everything we mention must have this indescribable ele-
ment we call life if we are to go forward either in law or in
power-either through authoritative action on the outside or the
fiery dynamo of conscience inside. And what is life has always
defied the scientists and philosophers. Perhaps it always will
and always should in our scheme of things. But in some way we
must thrust for it and we must always recognize that it is an
inarticulate part of everything that we do describe.
The human race itself seems to have only limited periods of
creativeness. A particular country will have a debauch for rea-
sons that none are wise enough to understand fully, and then
slip into brief or long periods of what can hardly be described in
milder terms than degeneracy and failure. Perhaps in dealing
with it this is our limit. This amazing power of transforming
apparent death by life, this seeing far beyond what seems to be
the limit of our grasp, is a necessary part of everything and
must be fought for and kept vivid at any cost.
If we talk of the divisions of law and power under the seven
divisions of the Good, we are talking and thinking subjectively.
This causes us no great concern about objective reality, since
when we think in experience itself-the way people live and
do things everyday-the subjective side does come first. Thus
we think equality or freedom or unity, and then we seek and
use actual experience of these things. This pursuit of the Good
in all its phases, of course, uses social and economic wealth for
the sustenance and strength of the people and their health and
education and daily living. But we tell the truth when we put
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the idea of these things first and the finding and the using of
particular instances of them, second. The objective world and
what's inside your skin are, of course, both used and are inter-
dependent. The beautiful picture gives you an experience of
beauty, and the capacity inside for enjoying this and reverencing
it leads to action in creating more beauty and creativeness else-
where. Instances of the legal interests in health, security, eco-
nomic freedom, educational strength, all these we experience in
the fields of both law and power under the divisions we have
just named (legal rules, legal interests, and the others) but it
is the consciousness (conscience, if you will) inside your skin,
as we use language, that enables us to evaluate these things and
to act-perhaps in fear and despair, but still to act.
HUMAN EQUIPMENT
The equipment of men for handling both law and power is
amazing. Perhaps it was admiration for what human beings
could do that really impelled Plato and Aristotle to their specula-
tions in the first place. Perhaps Shakespeare has expressed it
best: "What a piece of work is man; how noble in reason, how
infinite in faculty." When we think of human powers in this
sense, perhaps we put the mind first and then the brain. But
surely we think of the mind in a more fluid and all-pervading
sense than we do of the brain. By our conventions in speech, if
nothing else, we give a definite, substantially physical content
to the brain and we place it as something that the mind uses
while remaining free of any control by the brain in the total
powers of the mind itself. Thus the structure of the brain, if you
like a physically scientific question, is also a very real one for
people, both as lawyers and as individuals. This does not in any
way mean to give special significance to the brain. It merely
means to observe it as best we can and try to increase our
knowledge of its just place in the whole scheme of things.
To begin with, consciousness, perhaps briefly in the sense of
creating new opinions that do not flow in strict causation from
the past as changes in the physical world are said to do, is of the
first importance as a process that at least seems to take place
largely in the physical brain. Lord Cambridge (E. D. Adrian)
has explored the physical side of the brain. He finds that prob-
ably this faculty of consciousness or indeed conscience or fixed
values for the future (thought in somewhat these basic phases),
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is located to some extent at least in the connection between the
anterior frontal cortex and the dorsomedial nucleus of the tha-
lamus. Recent experiments by other medical and physiological
scientists make this area larger or smaller according to their
various findings. They give the striking comment that this
region, in any case, seems much larger than this thinking process
requires. This seems a most important finding in connection
with every interpretation of the brain. Of course, it may mean
that this apparently needlessly large area is really used in think-
ing in ways we don't understand. But, it means, if nature itself
has supplied a larger area than is used by any significant process,
that this would be contrary to the usual pattern, in which man's
physical equipment seems to change largely to meet his changing
needs, and not to exceed them in the first place. Perhaps there
is some hidden explanation in this whole matter. Perhaps in a
practical sense it means there is great reserve of physical ele-
ments there which can ultimately be used for the thought and
power of man. If we do have this reserve of ultimate power
operating through the mind with the use of the brain, it is en-
couraging as perhaps no other discovery of modern times has
been. Does it not seem far to excel the significance of the atom
bomb or any other kind of such control over atoms as we have
now or may indeed have in the future? In a most definite way,
it seems to point to the almost unlimited control of matter by
spirit without using either of these terms in a primitive or sep-
aratist sense.
Kant gave it as his opinion that the study of the starry
heavens above and the moral law within were the subjects most
significantly worthy of the efforts of man. Perhaps if we change
''moral law" to "moral power," and trench strongly on this
tentative assurance of great reserve equipment for the mind
and spirit, we will have a view of human powers in which this
power of spirit should be moved to first place even above the
starry heavens themselves.
In a word, the mind itself, the human spirit and the universe
in all its phases-everything, excepting only the supernatural-
is the true province of the lawyer and the true province of man
everywhere. If we deny this ultimate inclusiveness, we will in
the end impair our most particular rules and the most practical
even of the administrative side of the law. In this approach,
therefore, we consider other elements which do not seem to fit
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precisely in the divisions we have already suggested. One thinks
at once of humor (or at least some of us do) and then we move
on to judgments, which perhaps should come first because they
seem to be just another way of stating what consciousness and
conscience do for us.
We are told that one touch of nature makes the whole world
akin. And again that the essence of humor is cruelty, but we
don't believe it. Too much goody-goodyness is offensive. Since
it is an excess in itself, perhaps any of it is offensive. But we
still think that humor itself leads to the Good; and, if this
makes you sick that is your lookout. Straight off, let's admit
that at least the second test is false. Perhaps satire is based
largely on cruelty though even this is to speak in hyperbole.
When Horace wrote his satires he was in large measure writing
what we might now call realistic essays or something close to
a realistic novel. It may be that one can use cruelty in any form
of writing, and that it is somewhat involved in much so-called
humor. But this is a far cry from saying that cruelty is in-
digenous to humor in an inevitable sense.
No: humor is the protagonist against falsity or pretentious-
ness. Thus it brings us to the Good, though by indirect and very
attractive ways rather than in a prosaic and direct manner.
Humor is the good friend of kindliness and pricks the bubble of
the pompous not in cruelty but in devotion to the Good. Indeed,
humor has a merciful and healing effect on the pompous calf
himself and brings him back to kindly living in the most effec-
tive and the gentlest way that may be possible.
And don't tell us that this is an abandonment of the law as
well as of common sense. Think what the world would be if
there were no humor - if there were none of this magic to heal
wounds and curb the oppressor. It is a part of our blood and
bone and it is impressed in every rule of law we have. The law
would have to be so different if it were not aided by this amaz-
ing force. We ourselves would need a strangely different way
of life if humor were not there to make our present life possible.
And perhaps the most revealing part of it is its illusive quality;
so that even the critics rarely attack it directly and no one is
so literal as to claim he understands it. We are told that the wind
bloweth where it listeth, and in an illogical analogy we some-
times think of those phrases of Goldsmith where we try ineffec-
tively to identify humor: "And thou sweet poetry, thou loveliest
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maid ... thou guide by which the nobler arts excel; thou nurse
of every virtue...." Thus what he ascribes to poetry, we apply
to humor.
But if we try to capture it even by the gentler means that
eschew definition, humor eludes us. It is in the awkward futility
of a young colt, and the crinkles around the eyes of an old codger
smoking his pipe. It is nothing, if you like, and then again it is
indispensable to the breath of life itself. But, offensive as it
may be to hobble it by label, it does indeed achieve the Good when
the heart blood itself might fail.
We say that morals is what the conscience does through its
judgments. It is a strange and often new idea to think of the
conscience in both a spiritual and an almost physical sense. At
least parts of the brain are used by the mind and the spirit to
turn out judgments of our consciousness or our conscience. Part
of the factory that turns out these judgments is actually in op-
eration inside of us. And judgments are comforting things in
that they so obviously transcend our own petty systems and our
conventional arrogance into putting things into pigeonholes and
then saying that we have settled the matter for all time. The
judgment on a particular problem may involve elusive factors
that we have not put into words and indeed that we are too stupid
to put into words. But nevertheless these very important ele-
ments do go into the sum total of the judgment and we are con-
scious of this.
Yes, you have guessed it! This, too, goes to the Good, for too
much direct comment on the Good is presumptuous on the one
hand and very crude on the other. But in this, in mercy, the judg-
ment saves our humor, and our gaiety, and our modesty, and our
sanity. It enables us to use many factors which we desperately
need for the job at hand, long before we can identify them our-
selves, and still longer before we could separate them and find
them.
Our judgments express our conscience and all of the under-
standing and freedom that this means. The word has taken on
somber tones which are indeed false. By judgments we live in
gaiety and freedom and gentler understanding. We use in daily
actions that greater part of life which we cannot put into words.
While the notion of a judgment (assessing value) is cheerful
and a device of high quality in that it enables us to use so much
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that we cannot separately label, it also seems akin to a particular
source of strength, namely, self-restraint. This, of course, is tied
to the Kantian notion of duty and his view that conduct is not
meritorious unless it springs from a sense of duty. If you do the
Good happily because of your own unforced devotion to it, this,
according to Kant, is not a moral act. Morals in this sense
must come from conduct that is carried out because of a
sense of duty, not because of a love of the Good. To us, this
seems forced, and perhaps similar to the other Kantian uni-
versals that flow from his too-rigid allegiance to abstractions as
in his view that punishment is not only deserved for sin but is
justly demanded by the sinner, and hence should never be
changed by mercy. Restraint is not the pathway to morals in the
sense of a more elevated achievement than the free love of the
Good. More accurately perhaps, it is like fear of the Lord, being
the beginning of wisdom but not its fulfillment. In these terms,
the love of God, as it were, parallel to the love of the Good, would
be the fulfillment.
In his Ode to Duty, Wordsworth expresses this: "Stern
daughter of the voice of God! 0 duty! . . . There are who ask
not if thine eye be on them ... Glad hearts! ... Who do thy will
and know it not."
We have discussed the deficiency of the humanists in urging
only restraint to the excesses that selfishness and vanity and all
the evil emotions can bring on the human race. Evil as they are,
all these emotional excesses are active compelling forces. The
trouble with the humanists, and indeed most of the mere sys-
tems of ethics, has been a failure to counter these active forces
of evil with active forces of Good. The philosophers lack the
fiery dedication and the crusaders lust for battle. Restraint has
no aggression in it, no sacrificial zeal to fight to the death, not
merely exercising restraint at every turn.
In keeping with this we have considered restraint as a part
of beauty, justice which is one of our divisions of the Good it-
self. Thus restraint is no longer a negative thing but partakes of
the aggressiveness of the Good, and is like the other parts of the
Good that it is engendered with the dynamic and devotional
forces. There are times, of course, when justice requires re-
straint and one's energies must go to holding back excesses. But
if the furtherance of equality, the rights of others, beauty itself
in the sense of proportion and understanding, must take the ag-
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gressive side and struggle for these things both in promoting
them positively and in curbing everything that tends to weaken
them, restraint can be thought of as a positive force that calls
out all the aggressive energies of the persons involved. For in-
stance, when some element of individual liberty is being crushed
by selfish zealots who are acting really in their own selfish in-
terests rather than for the common good, then restraint of such
conduct requires the most aggressive and fervent action to make
this restraint successful, and to protect the right as against the
wrong.
Perhaps the word "restraint" in this connection is more often
used in the sense that each individual should restrain his own
exuberance in which he sometimes mistakes his alleged good
motives and really indulges his evil ones. Thus the vulgar extro-
vert and demagogue should exercise restraint themselves. But
this too fits the qualities we have mentioned that restraint itself
is a part of the Good and it usually and properly involves the
energies and the devotion that are implicit in every phase of the
Good.
"Man is naturally good and that it is by our institutions alone
that men become wicked." - Jean Jacques Rousseau.
"Nothing is more certain than that our manners, our civiliza-
tion, and all the good things that are connected with man-
ners and with civilization, have, in this European world of
ours, depended for ages upon two principles; and were indeed
the result of both combined; I mean the spirit of a gentleman
and the spirit of religion." - Edmund Burke.
On these two statements, the war between the romanticists
and the humanists has been fought for more than a hundred
years. The battle is still going on and much of the territory is
still in dispute. Perhaps, however, we can remove some factors
on the ground that they are no longer incident to the ultimate
victory. First, the romanticists admit that the goodness of man
is not held back solely or principally by modern civilization. They
admit that there is evil in man and that devices of restraint in
civilization are often very helpful in curbing this evil. Perhaps
one of the matters chiefly in dispute still is the just nature of
"restraint." Is restraint a purely negative thing, a kind of
mechanical break that does not have human or dynamic forces
within it? Perhaps both the romanticists and the humanists now
agree that restraint must be a more active human thing than the
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original humanist definition. It is like the element of love itself
in a sense of limiting one's activities rather than expressing
them. Some indeed have intended to equate restraint with the
"ought" or self-control of the moral life. Granted that it may
have these characteristics in particular matters (as we have said
somewhat of right and wrong already), it is still a phase of the
Good as right and wrong are "subordinate parts of the Good."
Thus, in particular cases we can love the Good by hating certain
manifestations of evil for the moment and in particular difficul-
ties, rather than to stress the transcending beauty of Good itself.
We would agree that we should stress moral qualities rather
than humanitarian or supernatural. We would agree that the
control of evil stressing it by most religious and moral systems
is very necessary, and that emphasis on the positive side of the
Good is not always and in particular ways, the best way to con-
trol evil. But generally it is so; and to the humanists, in putting
restraint as the co-equal of affirmative action, or even its su-
perior - this is going too far. One overcomes evil with Good.
The thing to stress is the active part of the battle, not merely
its systematic description. Restraint does little good unless it
be used in the service of the Good through the power of love. It
is the active element of conscience that produces the peculiarly
separate elements of love and the Good. It is the force of con-
science acting through human judgment that wins the battle.
Part of the Good is to have some control and humbly exercise
some restraint. But if it goes no further than this in the service
of the Good, it is likely to fail. Perhaps the main defect with
ethical systems, and with humanism insofar as it constitutes such
a system, is that the quality of devotion and sacrifice are absent.
Mere ethical systems in the coolness of preferability of affirm-
ing one ethical principle as against another, this is too inactive,
too lacking in fiery aggression, to win the battle over evil. We
not only admit but affirm that this battle is always with us and
may well be lost unless the most heroic efforts are exercised.
We have mentioned that the great humanistic doctrine of self-
restraint must find a place separate from the love of the Good
as we understand it. The love of the Good from its very name
means a free allegiance, not usually including this sense of duty
or self-restraint, and the curbing of the tendency of wrongdoing
from Kant's doctrine that the ethically good is based on a sense
of duty not on a voluntary allegiance to the Good. There is, of
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course, grave danger of slipping into Rousseauvistic naturalism,
if we do not have restraint even on allegiance to the Good, when
this is expressed unwisely or insincerely and self-indulgently.
This element of restraint we subsume under our method of judg-
ment where we also lodge much of the naturalistic element that
has loomed so dominantly in philosophical thought in classical
and medieval times. Judgment seems to turn both on reasoning
and on a sense of fact. The determination of facts has often been
called not rational but emotional, on the ground that it is based
on preference and preference goes to the satisfying of the emo-
tions. It does seem, however, that many questions of facts and
their interpretation through judgment may have very slight, if
any, emotional content while the chief element is logic for other
conventionally grouped rational factors. We feel that the reason
can be subsumed under judgment, though there in large part it
will be mixed with emotion. Reason, as it has been used, is surely
too vague a term, especially when it was merged with moral
qualities as in much of medieval philosophy. These great philo-
sophical schools were impressed by what they thought the reason
did, and they made reason in a purely rational sense dominant
beyond the scope assigned to reason in modern times. The same
magnificent content, of course, is there, but to distribute it under
more intelligible and accurate names seems desirable.
For one thing, the word "power" covers many meanings
which the word "will" is now used to represent. Then there is,
of course, the problem of the expression "will to power," but this
might be put to one side on the ground that it is an incidental
instance. The meaning of power can be transferred to will for
many purposes while the phrase "will to power" can be shifted
to "drive for power," and indeed this latter would be more ac-
curate.
Among the modern humanists, Emerson is held in high re-
gard on the theory that he goes beyond the intuition of natural-
ism, and rises to the higher level of moral insights through by
what is called "the higher intuition." Our approach through the
"love of the Good" is perhaps like the higher intuition, not that
it goes beyond non-humanistic naturalism, but in our comment
already, we feel that the devotion in the love of the Good in turn
goes beyond any concept of the higher intuition that has been
expressed.
Restraint, of course, deals with the older term of self-denial.
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But, like most virtues, if pressed to excess, self-denial can be a
negative defeatist approach. Indeed, in some people it becomes a
positive vice. Their solution for almost every difficulty is to
withdraw or give up their own efforts, although their minimum
duty to others, as well as to themselves, fairly requires them to
go on, not stop or go back. From the law itself, we are often
told that a strong judge as well as a good judge takes jurisdiction
in order to meet actual needs of litigants, which is entirely com-
patible with Holmes' principle of judicial self-denial. Briefly,
this last means that the courts are careful not to go beyond the
proper province of the law itself in rendering their decisions. It
does not mean they are weak or ineffective in meeting the actual
and proper legal need when it comes before them.
The medieval emphasis upon devotion somewhat in the sense
of withdrawing from the world rather than meeting its needs
perhaps is a danger almost equal in virulence with the Kantian
principle that ethical value lies in acting from a sense of duty, a
kind of restraint, rather than from a devotion of the Good in a
positive sense. The unwise extreme on the other side is to let
free devotion to the Good crowd out some element of restraint
entirely. There are situations in which evil or excessives even
from good motives must be curbed. Otherwise, we drift into all
the exce'ssives of Rousseauism at its worst. On the other hand we
tend dangerously to a futile way of life without the zest and
necessary force of aggressive action, if we fail to see that devo-
tion to the Good in an active sense is the complete desideratum
to which restraint, self-denial, self-control carry only part of the
burden and lead us only part of the way.
CHANGING LIMITS FOR POWER
Ethics is a systemization of morals and morals is a worthy
furtherance of the Good. It must turn on ultimate individual
judgment, but it presupposes all manner of objective elements,
including especially the needs and difficulties of others. This is
not because the purpose is to further happiness in others in a di-
rect sense, although our hearts are unfailingly thankful when
happiness does result. But we want for them as we want for
ourselves, with happiness a matter of grace, a lovely thing that
not only cannot be commanded, but cannot be pursued, that is,
we want for others more fervently than we do for ourselves just
the chance to serve the Good.
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As for the separate existence of a priori concepts, which has
been so violently asserted and attacked through the ages, with a
recent fervent assertion of them by Kelsen, perhaps we may limit
our comment merely to this. A priori concepts, in the sense of
norms, are not totally separate from the rest of the universe in
the sense that they have no connection whatever with the rest of
the universe. Let us admit that they are mere relationships
with no physical existence. Hence, they are in the field of Sollen
rather than Sein. But by the very fact that they are relation-
ships, they impliedly state themselves that there is something else
to which they are the relationship. You can't have relationships
between the "nothingnesses." For instance, earlier in life, Rus-
sell said that a priori concepts were separate, and undertook to
"prove" this by claiming that a relationship to a relationship
was not verified by facts at all. But we thought this was folly,
because his very proof postulated facts in the situation some-
where and thus necessarily made his a priori concept related to
those facts at least indirectly. Now Russell seems to say that
a priori concepts are still separate because they turn on logical
language. This is a withdrawal from his more embracing state-
ment that we have just given, but logical statements in turn deal
with existences in the universe and these, whether tangible or
intangible, are facts. And it applies to purely imaginary state-
ments, because ideas are facts and the imaginary assertion itself
gains its attractiveness from its interpretation of facts.
We have preferred the love of the Good as the test of ethics
rather than the sense of duty. An added comment on this would
be that the sense of duty is a particular affirmation of one's in-
terpretation of the Good. Some things we follow because they
represent the Good to us. Occasionally these things also are pre-
sented to us as a sense of duty. Thus, the particular thing is con-
firmed by its appeal to the "ought" as well as our judgment of
the Good. But all ethical values must come under the Good, and
these often present themselves without this separate sense of
duty.
Thus we can reasonably think of Kant's test of duty as an
a priori concept confirmed by the experience of many people. It
amounts however, to a summary of the Good in the particular
case. That is, the Good in fact is the objective, extensive thing,
while the a priori label which we put on it covers on the "ought"
and in this sense only a part of the Good. Moreover, it is the
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"outside" in a very real sense, since we feel that Good is a factual
thing which we can reasonably approach in our observations, but
duty is subjective in the sense that honorable people devoted to
the Good will not always have the same reaction which is called
"the sense of duty" to the same part of the Good. The puritanical
branch of all religions is said to habitually act under a sense of
duty much more than others though surely the Good itself will
not vary merely because of this special habit of a particular
group. Indeed those who emphasize biography might say that
Kant's fervent devotion to the sense of duty may be explained
in part by his Scotch ancestry and their puritanical emphasis as
well as his German associations with their pietistic emphasis.
The duty emphasis rather than the goodness emphasis is a
particular construction which describes the subjective attitude
of certain persons. Thus, quite justly it is an a priori concept
varying with the persons and not with the factual content, while
the Good is the extensive one that can be verified in fact. We
would go on to the conclusion that the sense of duty can be veri-
fied in fact only to the extent of the experience of individuals
and not to the extent of the observation of the thing itself.
We have said "value is an attribute of action that furthers
the Good." We have also said that the Good "is that which fur-
thers worthy living." What are morals, or if you like the tech-
nical, objective science that we call ethics? I would say morals is
living the Good, while ethics is a description of this, or objective
tests of this, usually in the form of a complete system. Thus we
speak of the Aristotelian ethics or the utilitarian ethics.
The philosophers, especially the recent crop, seem more de-
voted to abstractions than the most hidebound variety in past
ages. It seems somewhat true as is often charged that the philos-
opher has to have a definite system to fight for or against in
order to make a living. Thus if you are in the dry goods business
you have to have shirts and neckties and underwear or go out of
business. The philosopher has to have something to juggle in a
clever way, or no one will read his books or go to his lectures.
This is surely one of the reasons why our philosophers do not
share the leadership to the kingdom of heaven. They claim lack
of such leadership is due to their honesty and moderation. No
doubt the worthy men are not conscious that it may be due in
part to their cowardice and falsehood.
Not under this banner of attack, but in a very humble spirit
we would suggest that an ethical system is the great philosophical
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indecency, somewhat as the late Mr. Wells said that a kingdom
in Greece where the early republics had lived was an historical
indecency. In other words, it seems to debase the good things
beyond the point of public tolerance.
On the analytical side, of course, there have been a number
of rather rigid assertions to which truly first-rate men have
given themselves. In a sense, Kant's whole distinction - between
the moral law based on a sense of duty, and the other factors that
influence human beings which may be intellectual and physical
but are not moral in this ultimate sense - was fundamental to
his thinking and perhaps to all philosophies since his time. He
felt, if an action was to be truly moral, it must spring from a
sense of duty only and not from an unconscious and unqualified
love of the good or of truth or of beauty. Thus, Kant felt that
mercy, being a denial of punishment that was based on duty,
could not be approved. The moral law required the punishment.
Hence, to show mercy was to break the moral law. In our view,
this is morals, crazy to the point of fanaticism. Such views might
be held by those who inflicted torture in the name of religion, but
they could not be held by one who saw morals from the point of
view of action, not as a rigid system to be literally obeyed, but
as a human and practical means to lead the good life in fact day
by day. Except for thought itself, surely morals is the most con-
vincing instance of action in terms of rich living.
Somewhat in the Kant manner, perhaps most modern philos-
ophers have made a sharp distinction between the sense of duty
and the sense of personal preference. Thus, in the field of gen-
eral morals, Wordsworth in his Ode to Duty gave first place to
a natural and unrestrained love of the good life, but he added
that that kind of devotion in everyday human beings almost al-
ways broke down at times. Then he felt that duty came in to
carry you in the good life when heart and mind might fail. We
would go along with this as an interpretation of morals in the
sense of living the Good rather than as a moral system. For in-
stance, Broad says that he doubts that the sense of right can be
expressed fully in devotion to the Good. We think it can. And
we think he is really not talking about the same thing when he
,uses right (or duty) as against the Good. We think right has a
connotation of battling, of fiery action in support of the Good.
It differs from the Good in its quality of activity, not in its con-
tent. After a fervent dispute with oneself, a person may come
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up with the fervent assertion, "This is right and I am going to
fight for it." He probably does not use similar expressions about
the Good. For one thing, probably his feeling about the right
has been about a rather definite and particular issue. It is easier
to be definitely determined on a particular thing than to feel
equally about the Good which we generally consider in its many
aspects. Note that the Good itself is action, but it is a more com-
plicated and varied presentation than most assertions of right.
Our approach to duty, the sense of moral obligation, is similar
to our view of right. One sees the Good perhaps not in its most
appealing forms but nevertheless one is convinced it should pre-
vail. Thus he follows the Good in this instance in spite of many
temptations not to follow it (St. Christopher crossing the river).
But the sense of duty is an exercise of the Good under trying cir-
cumstances. It is not strictly a separate ethical concept and it is
not antagonistic to the Good. Thus we would say that both duty
and right are names we apply to special aspects of the Good.
They are not separate or antagonistic.
One very important approach to action is the distinction be-
tween action perhaps on the level of systems in an objective
sense, meaning just doing something toward it as a formula, and
action in a subjective sense. Thus the glories of objectivity here
come down to futility. "The mind is the seat of empire." No
doubt, as that statement is intended, we have insisted that what-
ever else happens, the individual must never abdicate his own
judgment on right and wrong. But action that leads to accom-
plishment ties in the objective with the subjective in a way that
is both merciful and victorious. This is action as it were, in the
field of action, and without this there is no hope.
Most theories of ethics are stated objectively in the sense that
a certain moral view is postulated on the ground that it does
represent the actual view of most people or the usual view of
the person himself. Thus they begin with a universal postulate
in terms of existing opinion.
These, in turn are usually hedonistic, with perhaps a rather
generous utilitarian coloring. Now all this type of thinking lends
itself to norms, and norms, in our view, lend themselves to follies
and the strange vanities that come to people who rely on logic
and abstractions, at least when they do so in a substantial sense
and in disregard of common sense.
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We have put ethics, like everything else, in terms of action.
Action, of course, can be bilateral and we are quite happy to
recognize common experience in that goodness cannot be pur-
sued alone. You have to be good with regard to something (hence
there has to be an objective element). Also, goodness without
relation to other people seems possible enough so far as logic
goes, but it does seem an unnatural situation and unthinkable in
a practical sense. We have mentioned that one of the most neces-
sary and surely one of the most attractive forms of serving the
Good is in helping someone else by mere blunder perhaps from
following a course that will deprive him of his own greatest serv-
ice to the Good. This is not intrusion, or self-righteousness. It
is the highest and the most elementary form of serving your
brother, or not living to yourself alone, or any other way you
want to put it. To serve the Good is the greatest happiness. Thus
perhaps on the negative side we can talk in terms of happiness,
not in the sense of happiness for ourselves or happiness for
others as a direct objective, but merely to lend a hand if nothing
more when an emergency comes up, and some fine person will
take the wrong road, perhaps from pure blunder or pure ignor-
ance if we do not serve his need.
But in a more technical sense, ethics or morals is indeed bi-
lateral. Ethics is in the field of action and action must be inci-
dent to some objective and usually the objective means other
activities, and most vitally, other people. For instance, take the
specific case of little children. Most children's stories that are
really popular with the children themselves deal amazingly with
moral questions. Here, some older people, who do not want to
burden the children with moral talk, fall into fantastic blunders.
The children are not burdened with moral talk that is honest
and understandable. They delight in it, naturally and freely,
without any urging of any kind. Of course, they like adventure
and they like excitement. But these are of the essence of morals.
Surely things don't have to be dull in order to be moral. Even
the saints are said to be very cheerful and imaginative people.
Children are naturally concerned about .what is fair and what
isn't and about what is the right thing to do in different situa-
tions. And why shouldn't they be? Obviously, success and happi-
ness in their way of life turns upon whether they meet situations
satisfactorily or not. The very idea of fairness or approval in
their problems is constantly present in the sense of ethics and
morals.
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Of course, Del Vecchio talks about the sentiment of "justice."
But this is not "sentiment" the way the professional philosophers
use -it when discussing ethics. They mean to prove the existence
of a particular ethical view by submitting that a person of
worthy outlook or perhaps the average person, or the vast ma-
jority of right-thinking persons agree on a particular ethical
view. By this means they hope to prove the actual existence and
the merits of the ethical view they identify.
Not only Spinoza and Hume but apparently all later philos-
ophers on this subject disagree somewhat with each other but
they all seem to agree on the general method. Somewhat illogic-
ally, we might add here that they all are not committed expressly
to hedonism as an ultimate test but they all do seem to give an
amazing emphasis to the test of happiness or perhaps the great-
est good of the greatest number in the total scheme of things.
It seems to us that identifying particular divisions or stand-
ards of ethics by these tests of sentiment or opinion either in in-
dividuals or in groups is artificial. We have found and have
built our thinking upon what we suppose to be a fact, that there
is in this world either now present or in material from which it
can be secured, a tendency to the Good or a preference for the
Good. Beyond this, we think the selection and classification of
ethical cataloging is a matter of temporary arrangement or habit
and has not permanent separateness.
But we would make this distinction clear: while we think the
analysis of ethics is a matter of listing the opinions of competent
people as in the case of judges and in their judicial decisions
from time to time, we do not think that these factual catalogings
are a final determination of the existence of the material thus
catalogued. Once more, we think we must use objective material
for our guidance to keep us conscious of the world around us and
keep us humble and keep us sane. But in the ultimate judgment,
we think the individual must make the choice and give the de-
cision and in the ultimate sense, we think this is subjective, it is
inside his skin, and as a man in any sense he cannot abdicate.
There are many ways in which power can be exercised for
good without the indulgence of mere caprice. For instance, under
the Uniform Trust Distribution Act, a trust that is run ineffi-
ciently with loss of the corpus to the beneficiaries may be dis-
tributed under court order. Where the directors of a closely held
[Vol. XVII
LAW AND POWER
corporation do not pay dividends and do not pay substantial
wages to most employees while they do pay exhorbitant salaries
to themselves as officers, the courts have now gone very far en-
tertaining minority stockholder suits to prevent all these ex-
cesses. Incidentally, a great deal, is. now done by voluntary action,
without any legal compulsion at all. For instance, many large
corporations now advertise that they will pay an equal sum to
that paid by any employee up to $I,000 to that employee's college.
Well, voluntarily to lay yourself open to unlimited gifts within
these very extensive limits would have been thought straight in-
sanity only a few years ago.
Somewhat differently are the vast sums that industry now
sets apart for research, in which they often pay higher salaries
and embark on more ambitious plans than our great universities
or the government itself. The line of demarcation under power
that you can exercise within your legal rights and what is com-
pelled by the law itself is again quite different now from what
was formerly the case.
This again holds in international affairs. We do indeed give
billions to the Western democracies that were so devastated in
the late war. These are magnificent gifts without any strings
attached and should be honored for the great service they render
and the generosity and faith they manifest, to a degree unthink-
able even a few years ago. Yet granting all this, in building up
foreign economies we may indeed be building our own strength
on a different plane and our own material profits and advantage
so that it does work to the Good in ways that would have been
thought contradictory or pure folly within the very recent past.
Among the many things that we have perhaps neglected
hitherto is not only the various forms of mental activities that
seem to be so different from our usual concepts of time and
space, but, also the more readily acceptable and cognizable new
experiences in relationships. With amazing freedom we still
work together for mutual wealth, where hitherto we would be
told that one side would profit and the other lose. This phase of
relativism is transcendant and good. This, of course, has nothing
to do with the moral abdication in which you accept the stand-
ards of the past regardless of whether or not they are equal to
the needs of the future.
When we think of the one and the many and the amazing
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values that are involved in these infinite relationships we have
to think again of international affairs as they have never been
before and perhaps of the world in the future which though we
cannot foresee it, we can be humbly certain that it will be very
different even from what we have now.
For instance, now we build up the Western world from its
terrible devastation with our billions - a munificence that has
never occurred before. And though we did not do it for this pur-
pose, yet building up the Western world industrially was and is
necessary to the vigor of our own economy.
On a national plane, we happen to be passing through doubts
just now about the soundness of the bull market. Whatever all
the factors may be, it is now pointed out that the price of stocks
may not be due entirely to the fair value of the business inter-
ests of all kinds that make the strength of these companies, but
partly at least to the fact that there has been a very clever,
though perhaps honest and wise effort to get the small investors
everywhere to buy common stocks. Nothing of the kind has ever
occurred before. Even the terrible boom and smash of 1929 in-
volved the rich and the professionals along with a mere sprin-
kling of small investors.
The Securities and Exchange Commission itself involves
action only where there is an actual misrepresentation at least
in the matter of the prospectus as covered by the statute. But
the common investor is in no position to interpret this prospectus
intelligently. Often financiers themselves are deceived although
no actual false statement is involved. All manner of forces may
be at work to force stocks up far beyond what the assets and
advantages of the corporations themselves justify. The present
bull market may involve serious inflation for which perhaps old
people with their fixed investments will suffer most in extent
and most in the cruelty of the consequences. Price-fixing and,
correspondingly, rise in wages and other items may lead to infla-
tion. These, however, are fairly open to public observation and
frequently involve bitter and open contests perhaps between the
laborers on one side and the propertied interests on the other.
But such a thing as an artificial rise in stocks, without violating
the present statutes at all, may well lead to a crazy and ruinous
inflation far beyond the usual factors or other elements we have
mentioned.
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So far as power goes in private law, it must deal with great
flexibility and not much in the field of rigid rules whether stat-
utes or otherwise. The very nature of our capitalism presupposes
this initiative and freedom. It goes to the effectiveness of our
whole system, though it is very dangerous. It is enforced mainly
by self-interest or self-energy, not legal rules. Hence much more
than in the narrow scope of the law, it relies on moral values.
But perhaps the chief thing for us to note is that while it has
this dangerous individualism, it also has fantastic dependence
on the activities of others. We all act independently, but if we
don't act in some way or other we all lose. Perhaps in a few
words, it is the glory and the danger of freedom. This gives the
precious element of initiative, giving the healthful flow of the
main stream of the river, and not the disease-infested waters of
the adjoining values which enjoy only stagnation.
It is seen at once, however, that this freedom which we have
put first involves action by everybody. By way of paradox we
can say that freedom itself, as it were, in its own dedication
must be freedom for others too, if it is to exist at all. And the
others in turn must exercise this freedom or it will die for the
first group because of their own non-action. The particular dif-
ficulty with us is that we have no precise rules to compel this
exercise and since we are dealing with freedom, it is a contra-
diction in terms to talk about compelling freedom. Surely this is
one of the ultimate difficulties of our life and perhaps an ulti-
mate reason for saying soberly that the good life is never sep-
arate from any vital living and that the pursuit of the Good in
this freedom is our final hope. Intermittently, and with all our
defects, we must love the Good and we must fight for it. The
brotherhood of man is perhaps most magnificently seen in that
everyone must do this, the less worthy and the cowards along
with the others or no one at all can do it in the end. You can't
sell shoes to slaves who don't wear shoes. You can't operate an
airline if no one has the money or the need to travel on it.
So far as this irresponsible use of freedom goes, we seem to
have at least a partial solution already in the field of interna-
tional law. For two hundred years or more from Grotius' great
book in 1625, it was assumed that the sovereign had absolute
independence and equality and that these amazing powers could
be used capriciously. Recently, this has been much questioned
by the ablest men in international law. Now it is usual to say
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that sovereignty is absolute, proportioned to the needs under the
circumstances, but not beyond this. The real needs of a country
can be protected' by the absolute freedom and equality of the sov-
ereign. But it does not follow that the sovereign can injure
others from pure caprice, and without reasonable correlation to
protecting his own needs at all. Thus we see, in international
law, where we do not have the, enforceability of private law, and
hence the problem of pure power more nearly confronts us, we
have a very definite basis for fixing the limits of freedom, even
though particular legal rules do not obtain. In dealing with
power in private law, perhaps this is a good starting point, which
preserves freedom without limiting initiative. We doubt if this
ever can be reduced to fixed rules or rigid norms of any kind.
There must always be a proper admixture of freedom. But the
basic assumption that all must try to share in the standards of
a common life whatever these mean for each particular people
or each particular industry or place, this it seems we can assert
in some degree, and this in turn will make reasonable activity
possible for everyone. No one will quit from mere laziness or
cowardice. We do indeed use the elements of the good life to make
freedom itself possible for all of us in spite of the possibility of
its abuse.
And it's not quite as gloomy as it seems. Freedom in an evil
sense is not altogether easy to practice if your habits are good
in practicing dependable cooperation. There are many ways that
help the little businessman from folding up and going to pieces.
Our whole world is permeated with goodness and these things
help the weak to do their part in spite of all the claims of selfish-
ness. Lady Macbeth protested against the goodness of this very
thing when she said, "Had he not resembled my father as he
slept, I'd have done it." For us as well as for her, we must note
the plain fact that she didn't commit the murder and that some-
thing in that face tied her to the cultural triumphs of the ages
and stayed her hand in spite of herself.
It isn't only the professed hedonists who trench strongly on
pleasure and happiness as a test of ethical conduct. We find it
not only in Spinoza and in almost all other modern philosophers,
but there is a good deal of it in the classic ones such as Aristotle
and Plato and even the earlier Greek philosophers.
Put very generally, it does seem to be the method, of almost
everyone to test ethics largely by whether they produce what is
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called pleasure or happiness. For instance, the utilitarian theory
of the two Mills and of some great legal philosophers, of the
greatest good of the greatest number, is surely in substance the
test of pleasure or happiness. Substantially speaking, the test
seems to do credit to those who urge it, in that it is a very prac-
tical and direct effort to benefit people, rather than what you
might expect from philosophers in asserting an abstract prin-
ciple.
But the thing won't work. You don't make a man happy by
feeding him strawberries and cream three meals a day. You
probably make him sick and rather soon you kill him by that
process. Nor is it fair to say that a denial of the hedonistic the-
ories really amounts to some severe duty theory that might work
for a puritan or a misanthrope, but is not kindly and full of true
sympathy for others. No, the pleasure-happiness test must be
rejected because of its own deficiencies and in spite of the most
friendly and general will to bring every good to others.
The trouble is that pleasure-happiness just doesn't bring hap-
piness or pleasure in any dependable sense. There was the wom-
an of Samaria who went for water, surely a desirable thing. But
she was told that if she drank of that water she would thirst
again. It was important for her to drink water from which she
would never thirst but which would be in her a well of water
springing into everlasting life. If you seek pleasure or happi-
ness directly, it usually eludes you. Some say it always does, and
the apparent exceptions are cases in which you pursue a thing
which has other elements of the Good in it, and these are the
ones that give it continued force, not the pleasure-happiness part
for its own sake.
Many philosophies are largely devoted to ways of stating
pleasure-happiness so that a worthy system of ethics can be
based on it. But this is a chimera. It is the good life that we seek
in which we really include the right as well as duty, in spite of
Kant's objections and the objections apparently, of most every-
one else. Happiness therefore comes to us when we pursue the
Good, but we have noted it comes indirectly by grace, as the re-
ligious people say, not by right, as the politically and morally
minded tend to express it. And why not? If we love the Good
because of the pleasure in it, what a revolting baseness that
would be. If we are told that the philosophers would have to
invent Good if there were none, couldn't someone say that we
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would have to invent the doctrine of grace, in the name of humil-
ity, and freedom from self-righteousness and the graciousness
which is indigenous to the very life of a gentleman or a lady,
even if the religious folk had never mentioned it?
Some seek to escape the baseness of a hedonistic philosophy,
by saying that the individual does not seek his own happiness in
a selfish or crass way. He unselfishly seeks the happiness of
others. But even this won't do. In his Portrait of a Lady, Henry
James points out that one must be modest for others as well as
for himself. One cannot seek happiness directly himself, nor
further such an ambition in others. In one case you debase your-
self; in the other you debase others, and you end up on the ashpile
either way. In every sense one is entitled to the chance to fight
for the Good. There is no selfishness or baseness in that, and
the lowliest person, the one with the most faults, is entitled to
that amazing richness of life.
We would put it this way. Each seeks the Good for himself
and others. That surely is a brief statement and an unqualified
one. What is the Good, is something upon which we do not al-
ways agree. Even on this, however, if we compare the opinions
of people without trying to state it in an actual formula, it is
amazing how close we come to agreement so far as particular
action goes, regardless of our theory. Here again, of course, this
seems fortunate to us who follow the action theory of law and
ethics. Time and again, as if by miracle, if we take the doing
rather than the talking, if we take the action rather than the sys-
tem, there comes agreement, and the difficulties disappear.
There are, of course, different views of the pleasure-happi-
ness objective. They often speak of egotistic happiness as against
community happiness. But what we have said indicates very
briefly our view that either method of happiness as a pure ob-
jective holds within itself futility. It might be called an ulti-
mate proof of the brotherhood of man, first that others have to
give you the happiness and, second, that you can't even seek it
yourself.
Seeking happiness won't do, and even seeking accomplishment
for its own sake has a smug prosaicness that is offensive. Surely,
there is not need to growl at the world because of the marvelous
completeness that is found in both the one and the many, the
individual and the group. Without talking dualism, from the
[Vol. XVII
LAW AND POWER
marvelous unity that comes from considering the one and the
many together, as a unit, not a dualism, we are able to reach
results that do indeed seem free from all dross yet would be de-
pressingly mediocre to say the least, if it were not for these ap-
parently contradictory and irreconcilable elements.
Perhaps a primary misconception in making pleasure-pain
the test is that it covers other elements that are the important
ones, although these are in effect hidden by the pleasure-pain
label or, if you prefer, subsumed under it. All sorts of useful and
worthy purposes that ethics can properly serve are present and
are properly there, but are subordinated to this blatant pleasure-
pain test. The pleasure-pain test in a direct sense simply won't
work. The enjoyment of pleasure and the avoidance of pain are
both good and compatible with worthy living in every sense. It's
merely that you rob yourself of pleasure and freedom from pain
rather than secure them, if you pursue them directly. Modesty,
humility, sense of humor, if you like, require that you proceed
indirectly.
This is not merely some affectation or some pretense, in
which you really want something but have not the forthrightness
or the honesty to say so. It is one of the many cases in which
we do work indirectly in this world. We have already noted as
poor Hegel saw so clearly that a capacity may lodge in one per-
son but it is always, as he said, "realized" through activity with
others. You can't enjoy a game of baseball if you are the whole
audience and all the players yourself. You cannot be a great
orator if there is none to listen to you and nobody expresses an
opinion of any kind about your efforts. The greatest artist must
in some way have his pictures honored in the mind and heart of
the humble layman. All this tends to break down selfish prece-
dence and to strengthen a kindly and wise equality. Of course,
we hope, however, that this is not interpreted on the base side so
that we tend to glorify mediocrity at the expense of excellence.
Our approach therefore, will not be to deny pleasure-pain
achievements in this indirect sense. Indeed, we will try to in-
crease it where in any case, it has been unjustly minimized. But
we will talk in terms of pursuing the actual Good both directly
and indirectly. This can be done in human affairs, without de-
feating any worthy purpose or introducing any base element. Of
course, in saying we pursue the Good directly and indirectly, we
mean that we must proceed tactfully and adroitly using highly
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indirect methods even here where this will be most considerate
and effective. It is often the indirect service that is most ef-
fective though it may not always further the self-esteem of the
less worthy. It is sometimes pointed out that since the Diety
Himself furthers his ends through particular individuals, it is
highly honorable for any individual in turn to use the same
method. Of course, all this is said with full consciousness of the
zest and good cheer that comes from one's completing his own
job with the just satisfaction that goes with it.
It is a bit shocking to some people to find how large a place
happiness as a test of ethical devices takes in the thought of even
the most conscientious and devoted philosophers -men like
Kant and Sidgwick, for instance. But here again we differ di-
rectly. We would say that happiness is never the test in a direct
and positive way. It is often involved indirectly and we may
wisely direct our conduct with a view to securing this indirect
happiness for others and, in carefully diluted form, for ourselves.
We are amazed, however, that these highly moral, pious people
put such great stress on happiness in a direct sense, and simply
forget all about serving the Good for its own sake, and treating
happiness as something that comes by grace, not by right. How
is it possible for the religious people, who talk so much about
grace, to forget all about it when they are pursuing the very
objects of the good life? Have they no sense of modesty, no con-
sciousness of their own defects, if nothing else. When these peo-
ple are in the army, do they batter the commander-in-chief with
demands for various heroic medals, even when they have not
been within .gunshot of the enemy, on the ground that these
would make them happy?
The hedonist theory is unsound because one pursues happi-
ness, which is repulsive no matter how it may be justified. Hap-
piness must come incidentally. It cannot be pursued. You can
pursue the Good so long as it is not for your own vanity or your
own advantage. Then if you do not pursue her, happiness comes
as a matter of grace, if at all.
We suspect the same is true of the Good. It is unpleasant to
think of one's pursuing the Good in the sense of some advantage
or vanity of his own. This is tied up with self-righteousness and
all the extremely unpleasant associations of one's favoring his
own salvation. But it is not only the pursuit of happiness for
its own sake that we reject. It is the pursuit of the Good, if this
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is done for vanity or selfishness. One must indeed love the Good
and not let the right hand know what the left hand is doing. Then
indeed there is freedom, and the dross of our living slips away.
We say evil is an insufficiency of the Good. Another way of
saying this, of course, is that evil though often extremely attrac-
tive is not for long. It always proves disappointing in the end.
Poor Macbeth learned the cruel truth of this, and Faust even
more so. "If ye drink of this water ye shall thirst again." And
poor mortals have foolishly doubted this from the beginning of
time, and then sometimes paid heart-breaking consequences to
learn its truth all over again. Everything must serve the Good.
Law and power serve it in different ways but in their different
though interdependent ways they must serve or perish.
This is why we state that law and power are not separate.
Wise law at least does not make slaves of men; hence, there is
some power under law, within the law. Even where power seems
unregulated, as we have noted, it really is regulated very great-
ly, first, by that sphere of law that clearly controls, and, second,
by the operation of the human conscience in free exercise of
power unregulated by the obvious and formal law. In keeping
with this, the divisions of the Good apply to both law and power.
Otherwise, law becomes tyranny and power becomes license and
self-destruction. This way of thinking gives strength and dignity
to both law and power. It frees us from the fear that we are
acting from selfish motives or mere animal impulses that are too
limited in their objects to serve the Good in its true purposes. It
gives us strength and confidence under both law and power and
it uses custom as well as conscience, and interpretation as well
as strict rules to serve in the total work of law-power, using all
the forces available for the good life.
Before considering the more detailed content of the division
of the Good, and separate particularly from the seventh division
which involves dedicated love itself, we would state an element
wHich goes to all these forces, though in a sense is separate from
them, in a very general use of words, somewhat as we have
spoken of humor and judgment in the armory of living. We mean
the practice of the power of the Good. Somewhat similar thought
has been expressed with greater fervor elsewhere by the mystics
and the religious people, to name only two. We evidently use a
somewhat similar expression on the more humble, practical claim
of daily living and the pursuit of truth. In a sense we would
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like to avoid intruding on higher thought even in this limited
way. But it is necessary to the scope of these ideas themselves.
It is proper in their field and cannot be ignored. This practice
of the power of the Good especially deals with the eternal vigi-
lance that is needed for the preservation of the Good, much as
we have been told that it is needed for the preservation of lib-
erty. It means, perhaps more particularly, that everlasting striv-
ing for quickening of energies and insights, remembering that
the future is pressing on us every second, and degeneracy and
death are the wages of those who are not renewed, also every
instant of winning these unrelenting battles, is meeting the fu-
ture that no one has met before. The Good in its seven divisions
would involve for most purposes all manner of practical things
as well as recreating intentions. But the cruel quality of prac-
tical doing day by day is essential to every other phase of the
Good. A civilization goes to pieces not only for lack of worthy
purposes but also for lack of technology to support the demands
of high living in practical affairs. Thus one must live the pres-
ence of the power of the Good in all its phases.
"Pain is not more strange than beauty." What about death?
This too is not difficult in the light of the Good. Death is merely
part of living. If we venture to identify reality at all, then sure-
ly it is in living considered in the sense of spirit, of the mind of
man, which involves the active conscience, and not some physical
thing in a separate sense only.
LovE OF THE GOOD
Association of ideas and evaluation as they are parts of think-
ing go to the higher capacities of the brain and the higher
achievements of the mind. These we think of as the less sensuous
phases of the brain and the more creative rather than pure phys-
ical phases of the mind. But the capacity "generalization," in the
sense of elementary and almost mechanical phases of the intel-
lect, trenching pretty strongly on the logical side of intellect, is
indigenous not only to the higher animals and man, but, in some
form, to the lower forms of life themselves. K. S. Lashley states
this as a matter of well-established physiology and others assume
it without serious qualifications. Does this mean that the "ac-
tive" reason, so accentuated in medieval times and, of course,
greatly honored both in ancient and in modern thinking, is really
not so important after all? No - decidedly No. In a word, the
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answer to this possible contradiction between the physical stu-
dents of the brain and the thinkers in philosophy is that the
philosophers and their allies right back to ancient times have in-
cluded morals and the intuitions of religion and ethics whether
in the mystical language of Pascal and William Blake, or the
more formal statements of religion within the scope of their
term "reason" or "active." But the intellect, largely in the sense
of logical deductions along with the logic by "analogy" in recent
times, seems to be quite common in brain activities right down to
the lower animals.
It is for this reason also that the venture was to stress "judg-
ment" rather than reasoning in our earlier comments on the
place of judgment in fixing law and power and in handling facts
in connection with universals. A judgment by its very definition
involves the handling of abstractions and facts together, with
conclusions that depend on both. This puts the finding of fact,
as well as the intuitive and moral forces in the position of honor
and deep reverence which they deserve, while it enables them to
work justly and sensibly with reasoning in the sense of "gener-
alization," and the use of universals and logic in connection with
valuation of facts and intuition.
Power may be thought of in many ways. We have considered
it in connection with law and in connection with judgments.
Perhaps it is best now to consider it incident to the Good, since
the Good demonstrates both law and power and is our guide
throughout the universe. The Good furthers power or, more
usually, power furthers the Good, on the same basic values as
law furthers the Good and the Good furthers the law. We have
noted two forms of power. One is power incident to selfish ad-
vantage which is found so much in modern psychology through
the consideration of impulses and instincts. But power devoted
to selfless accomplishment, power devoted to the Good for its own
sake, as against the selfish advantages of persons, is an approach
not found in modern psychology or physiology, or for that matter
apparently in modern scientific and social thinking anywhere.
Thus we do not think in terms of behaviorism and certainly not
in the current practice so universally followed in treating the
social sciences as "behavior sciences." To call a whole science,
or any phase of daily activity behavioristic is to be guided by
mass results at the best, not by individual moral efforts. But the
mass or the group is not a separate item. It does not exist apart
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from individual people who make it up. And, in our view, there
is always a moral element when an individual acts at all. But the
behavioristic approach for groups as well as individuals is mere-
ly to observe the results of group action, not to consider the
moral quality of the acts of individuals that make up those
groups; and we think to disregard or in any way slight or mini-
mize this vital moral element is fatal to man's stature and does
indeed lead to group and national and world deterioration as
well as for failure for the individual himself.
If we consider power in its place in the furtherance of the
Good, we have the approach that goes along with our similar
view of the law in a group of values that applies to both law and
power. Power by individuals and power by nations must be
judged in its furtherance of the Good, for instance, in economic
and political activities both nationally and internationally.
Power may be judged in part by the prosperity and health of
people and nations. But we do not place this test of prosperity
and health directly. Even health and all manner of worldly goods
are not ends in themselves. To say so would throw us back to a
materialistic or hedonistic system of values. Here and every-
where we seek the Good though, of course, material things, par-
ticularly in the instance of health and good standards of living,
greatly further the good life if well used. But we never leave the
valuing out of it. We think the pursuit of virtue in the sense of
the Good is the test, not a high standard of living, or seeking of
the individual for health or other particular advantages for their
own sake.
Worse than this, we think that people do not themselves truly
seek material advantages or happiness or even a worthy intel-
lectual life as final ends. We are glad to discuss and evaluate the
content of the different divisions of the Good, but only because
people - everyday plain people - do seek the Good themselves
in preference to any other ends.
There is this qualification: wholesomely, within their proper
spheres, impulses and instincts furthering selfish ends, serve the
richness of life. They give us self-preservation for one thing and
good sense in the practical forms of living. But hand in hand
with these selfish advantages for individuals and groups, there
is indeed, and in practice by actual ordinary people, a devotion
to the Good in this unselfish sense which they do seek along with
the selfish advantages that sometimes blind them to their own
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preference in furthering the Good as against the claims of im-
pulses, and instinct. Finally, of course, selfish advantages, when
kept in proper restraint and directed to proper ends, also further
the Good in the unselfish sense.
For each age is a dream that is dying
Or one that is coming to birth.
It is true that mere patterns of living are often unconscious,
and acquiesced in, by a whole people for an entire age, although
they are not really believed by the leaders of that age nor do they
represent actual patterns of culture. For instance, what we, like.
to. call the Age of Moliere, or most people call the Age of Louis
XIV, covered many good things of the spirit as well as incred-
ibly base things of decadence. The thing one must watch is
that the dominant note of the Age (the good spiritual things)
continued beyond the success of the Age in every real sense.
Thus the marvelous quality of Racine carried the Classical, period
of France long after actual and definite decadence had set in in
military, social, governmental, industrial, and most other phases
of life. Furthermore, the recovery from this decadence, as well
as the mere intellectualism of the eighteenth century, had set in
largely through the philosophes and partly through Rousseau and
Voltaire considerably in advance of men like Hugo, Lamartine,
de Musset and others who ushered in the Romantic century. In
a word, we must watch the good or evil that is actually operating
as well as the forces that seem to be in control at any one time.
We must watch the Age, whether it is dying or coming to birth.
To meet this at once in the law, the Middle Ages involved a
relational society with many phases of common or relational own-
ership, that superficial thinking might even call socialistic. And
this continued into the Renaissance in different countries so far
as legal rules went, although title to property had come to be
individualistic. The grocer had to own the corner lot outright,
and the villager had no right to pasture his cattle on the "com-
mon land." There are ample signs on the other hand at present,
that although individual property had its heyday about 1900, we
are now well into a new kind of relational society which the
courts are only beginning to interpret.
Incident to, these ideas about the assumptions of a whole peo-
ple, on, the ways of doing things, it seems that in our approach
in thinking in moral terms and in terms of action rather than in
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terms of static ownership of physical property, we are more like-
ly to judge accurately of these basic outlooks at different periods
than if we think more literally and slavishly in terms of physical
property.
A second point of view is somewhat similar to this first one.
If we think of physical things in their use and what they can do
for us, rather than the literal things themselves, we are better
able to adjust actual legal rules of the past to changing condi-
tions for the future. Perhaps most of our rules throughout the
law were set in rather permanent form not later than 1900. But
then perhaps this was the heyday of the industrial revolution,
although its earlier formulation was about 100 years before that.
Now we have introduced many relational ideas qualifying private
property, but we have only the older, individual, ownership
framework in the law to deal with these new relational factors.
If we saw property as use and advantage, we could more easily
adjust to the use and advantage under our recent relational so-
ciety while we continued to use the individualistic rules of 1900.
Then we would not have to fight over technical change in these
rules. True, the property remains the same, but our rules could
be interpreted to mean use or advantage, not ownership of fixed
property in a dead sense. Thus the rules involve no real change
if we give them quite a different interpretation under our rela-
tional society. We always intended them in terms of advantage
and use. We are now using them in terms of advantage and use,
though the content of these two tests have themselves changed.
But we expected this or some other change to happen from the
beginning of the rules themselves.
To take a single instance, though this approach, in a proper
sense applies everywhere: Family law is perhaps the most re-
lational of all. The Middle Ages was the heyday of the estate by
the entirety. There was little personal property or money for
anyone. Most property was land and tied up in family settle-
ments based on marriage. Then during our ages of individual
property, these relational elements broke down, especially in pio-
neer countries like America where the family settlements are
practically unknown. Here, for a long while in the Puritan re-
action in England and in Victorian England of almost a century
in which women took a most secluded role in life, individual own-
ership was fantastically dominant and the men were the ones
who benefited from this power. Now we are less relational than
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were the Middle Ages, but the pater familias pattern of the early
Roman law certainly does not apply today. There are many re-
straints by statute or otherwise on the husband's power to waste
the family savings or make none himself. Both wife and husband
are now interpreted to serve the family, not to gratify their sep-
arate lust for power. This is good sense and good law. But much
of the needless reactionary struggle of the courts to crush the
married women's separate property acts, in spite of the clear
legislation upon which they rest, could have been avoided, if the
courts had followed our realistic approach of the use of property
rather than its purposeless ownership.
LIBERTY (CHANGE)
Liberty, of course, if one attempts to define it, has baffled the
ablest thinkers. Liberty, however, along with all the divisions of
the Good, we will venture to define rather categorically, not that
we presume to solve the real difficulties by this, but that we ven-
ture to define only in such general terms that will leave ample
room for detailed differences by way of more particular interpre-
tation. Thus liberty we define as freedom in seeking the Good,
and we let this stand, whether it is freedom in affecting others
or freedom from interference by others. It is no secret that we
are going to define all of these divisions of the Good, first, in
terms of furthering the Good itself (much as we define value),
and second, in terms of action always, rather than in terms of
some system. One sees at once that stating liberty in terms of
the Good meets the difficulty about license rather than liberty
and also the difficulty of adjusting liberty to equality. True, even
evil may be the object of liberty and still indirectly serve the
Good, since we think of evil only as an insufficiency of the Good.
The problem of license is avoided by the very fact that our lib-
erty furthers the Good in some sense. As for equality, we think
that there is no logical difficulty between liberty and equality
although it has caused much dispute. Equality means treating
things equally that are equal in every pertinent sense. This
leaves room for liberty where, under the circumstances, the issue
of equality is not present. If the elements on the merits are not
equal in any just sense, then, of course, they are not to be treated
equally, and liberty is not impaired by any requirement of
equality.
In the case of liberty, perhaps more than in any other di-
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vision of the. Good, it is crucial to remember our view that these
divisions of the Good are not adapted to discussion, much, less
definition, in fixing logical terms. We are thinking always; about
these elements in action, and we are discussing them as part of
action in the. very fact of acting, and not as a logical statement
of a system of any kind. Thus liberty, so far as interference goes',
means freedom to, act in an immediate sense, without control by
others. The question of ultimate determinism is not thus in-
volved, although if we are pressed to say a word on that too at
this time, we would say that there is no logical or factual diffi-
culty between freedom and determinism, although they may well
be confusing in practical application. Determinism in our sense
(and we think rather generally now as used in the exact sciences)
is merely conformity to some method of predictability, although
human knowledge may be able to give only a device of intermit-
tent causation or predictability for certain units only. Freedom
on the other hand means this freedom for personal action and
freedom from outside interference, and entirely consistent with
determinism in the sense of the predictability we have just men-
tioned.
EQUALITY (JUSTICE)
We have just spoken of equality in connection with liberty.
Taking that as a comment on equality in a separate sense also,
perhaps we can add that one of the difficulties in handling
equality is in noting the issue involved in each case. There is
the old illustration that when you say a man is brave as a lion
you do not mean that he goes on all fours. You are comparing
the man to the lion in one respect only. Thus there may be this
similarity in the moral or emotional field of courage, without
questioning the very many and great dissimilarities in almost
every other respect. Frequently then the just requirement of
equality will apply to one particular matter in a separate sense,
and what one may call the infinite number of other attributes
of the subject will involve no issue of the equality at all and
will be conceded to require no equal treatment at all. Somewhat
as in the case of liberty, we mention again that our thinking of
equality is in the field of conduct, in the field of action, in the
field of evaluating, in the field of judgments that involve moral
issues, not in some fixed system which we think of as static in a
substantial sense. Equality then leads us at once to the matter
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of justice in a true estimate of values, and, of course, largely
ethical issues. It involves equality substantially as that term is
used in fixing justice, as it is found in the obvious symbol of
the scales of justice showing that they balance, and hence are
equal.
As for beauty, here again we state our brief definition boldly,
although we hope this does not imply a crass ignorance of the
grave difficulties involved. In the Thomistic view beauty is con-
sidered to have three elements: wholeness, harmony, and radi-
ance. We greatly admire this, and venture to define beauty in
those same terms, adding merely that they must further the
Good. This way, if you like, we avoid the old issue of whether
beauty can be found purely objectively, or purely subjectively,
or perhaps a little of both. We do not use the subjective-objective
approach at all. We say the elements of beauty may exist factu-
ally in the objective world, whether they be tangible or intan-
gible, but then we say that this definition itself is true in our
thought only in the field of action. Part of action is the mind
and the activities of men. Thus beauty in the objective sense is
necessarily true in some measure because it forms a part of
mental activity-it is used by the mind and its bare content must
include this bare fact that it is a part of action in this sense.
At the end of our seven divisions we will say summarily that
different views as to what the divisions mean in application to
particular problems in the law and in the exercise of power
will be found in court decisions and in the ethical conduct of
individuals and groups, where the legal or ethical views ex-
pressed in these judgments may well differ greatly, although
those who give their opinions come out with the same answer
in the particular case. In a word, we think of the conscience
as reaching these judgments and it is what the conscience does,
if you will, that we take as our conclusion, although realizing
that these results may well be due to the differing views that
people have in moral, religious, and any other fields of human
opinion.
OTHER PHASES OF THE GOOD
We must say at once that all the divisions of the Good are
important not only as separate desiderata, but perhaps even
more as devices for furthering the Good in a single and complete
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sense. Thus if there is a particular case for the courts or for
personal action, the object is to get the just or right result, that
is, securing the Good as a totality. Our divisions are merely for
convenient discussion and for convenient lessening of court de-
cisions and judgment of values. For instance, a principal phase
of beauty is the esthetic sense which merges into morals and
into questions of practicality. Of course, occasionally the courts
and individuals have questions of furthering beauty for its own
sake. But much more often, the sense of beauty helps one to see
a right result in the sense of justice or in the sense of furthering
the ultimate Good, without any question of beauty in a separate
sense at all. Or again, we can note that beauty is largely har-
mony or proportion, and these ideas are also justly found in
questions of equality and justice.
As for truth, definitions here have been so violently con-
tested. We say merely that truth is conformity to reality, though,
of course, some would answer that we are really saying that
truth cannot be defined since reality can hardly be given a con-
ventional definition. We would not seriously question this ob-
jection, but we prefer not to say that it is undefinable, although
we admit our definition may not prove very helpful. The signifi-
cant approach seems to be one of finding truth or approximating
it. Thus, in science, the pragmatic test of truth has many advo-
cates, since it is felt that the universal opinion of science at a
particular time on some clearly separate matter should be taken
as truth until a different opinion is generally recognized. We
prefer to take the pragmatic view as well as others as interpre-
tations of tentative views of truth under particular circum-
stances, and use the best one in this practical sense, without
claiming its ultimate truth at all.
It will also be noted that our tendency to state things objec-
tively, without subjective qualification, but merely state the
objective test in terms of action, enables us to preserve liberty,
since we introduce the subjective element through the decision
of consciousness or conscience in the particular situation. We
avoid the dualism in the subjective and the objective and we
keep the dignity of the individual in his judgment of the objec-
tive fact under the circumstances, leaving him free to use tenta-
tive guides or what he considers universal guides as he thinks
best.
The divisions of the Good that deal with "self-development
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for everything" and "particular accomplishment" are the two
that come closest to rules and legal interests and, if you like,
the property and personal rights which fill most of our law
today and in the past and probably in the future. Of course, an
institution cannot have self-development in the sense that an
individual can, but it is understood that we mean self-develop-
ment insofar as it can apply to the particular claimant whether
an individual or a group of some kind. Particular accomplish-
ment would cover almost the whole field of the law towards con-
tracts, property, and other divisions of the positive law.
These two differ strikingly, however, from legal rules or
legal interests and are justly included in the divisions of the
Good, because they are pursued in the furtherance of the Good
as well as for their own sake. In spite of all selfish claims, and
instances of rather crass conduct at times, everyday people,
people with lots of faults also, do have real delight in accomplish-
ment in an unselfish sense. True, under the development the
claimant justly wants his own education and his own achieve-
ment, and it is good for society that this is true. Thus we are
justly told that the selfish, perhaps unpleasant, businessman
plays the game ruthlessly but does give employment to thousands
of men who would otherwise go hungry. Perhaps they thus serve
their brothermen in a practical sense more than the idealist who
does little more than talk about it and does not increase wealth
or employment. But it is also true that he who seeks his own
development might probably feel real satisfaction in the indirect
advantage to his community. The contractor who builds the
house, the lawyer who arranges the mortgage that makes the
house possible, and all those involved in the transaction, also
take pride in the final accomplishment in a separate sense, and
not because of advantage to themselves.
This, of course, also goes for the sixth and seventh divisions
of the Good, the dynamic part and the selfless love. The dynamic
part strikingly includes courage and some of the grip of ac-
complishment that we have mentioned outside these divisions
of the Good, pointing out that it is essential to significant life
of any kind. These are more than the "self-restraint" we have
already discussed and perhaps they especially bring us to a con-
cluding element which, as it were, we do consider primarily in
both law and morals.
There is then both selfish ambition which psychologists
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usually list under impulses and instincts, and, without saying
so directly, indicate are - substantially - submerged in physical
nature; and there is also this unselfish love of perhaps the
same things but for unselfish motives, which, apparently, both
the psychologists and the moralists recently substantially ignore.
Quite different from this view in a very extensive use of lan-
guage, we hold that there is such a thing in experience as love
of the Good for its own sake both separate from personal ad-
vantage and, in the usual case, paralleling personal advantage.
It is wholesome and factual for there to be both personal and
selfish love and personal and unselfish love. We even dare to
say where this is in the mind and conscience, and as far as the
parallel is possible, in the physical body also. We have already
noted the definite opinion of the physiologists about the location
of consciousness and "arrangement" in the cerebral cortex. What
we mean by conscience is this judgment power that some insist
on calling consciousness only. We think the conscience, the power
to fix judgments on moral issues, is a part of consciousness and
thus, in the sense of brain location, is found in the same regions
of the cerebral cortex as consciousness itself.
But, if you ask, how do we identify this moral element from
the rest of consciousness? First, perhaps we should say again
that we think there is a moral element in every decision of the
mind. Hence, in this sense the conscience is a part of every
phase of consciousness. But to give a separate and perhaps more
significant identification of the love of the Good, we say this
devotion to the Good for its own sake is distinctly different from
the whole field of impulses and instincts that so largely make
up modern psychology, in that this love of the Good is selfless,
although common to ordinary men and though usually parallel
with selfish motives. In our view, this identifies morals as a
reachable thing-that-can-be-talked-about, as it has not been sep-
arated and identified hitherto.
One sees at once that this makes an approach to living both
in law and in power that we have not been able to identify and
to talk about before. First, it goes beyond self-restraint in
giving us all that is found in self-denial together with devotion
to the Good, that goes beyond denial of evil alone. Hitherto, in
the field of general standards, where perhaps Emerson's test
of the "higher intuition" has been the best guide that talks more
than creativeness and more than self-restraint alone, we in ef-
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fect include all these elements; but give the forces of the good
life the positive activity, the confidence and zest of a good fight
for the good cause, and do not leave this essential side of life
(perhaps justly called life itself) to the negative forces alone.
Perhaps we should put this for the moment in the terms of
the market-place as it were. Our practical friends tell us that
you can't meet something with nothing. If your armory against
futility and degeneration, as well as particular evils is no more
than self-denial (good as that is) then you leave the enemy with
all the weapons of offense, and futility and stupidity rely only
on defense.
One would like to deal with many phases of this at great
length. It lends itself to almost infinite variety in its relation
to other phases of thought and of action. It is, of course, our
hope that this fuller development by many persons and for the
indefinite future will in fact occur. Perhaps we may mention
only one of these many now. This is a time of great activity
by the forces of evil. So-called "brutality" (though often much
lower than the brutes so-called) is openly glorified. The most
degrading forms of self-indulgence are tolerated if not admired.
It is a moderate statement to add that these forces and this
tendency will indeed let loose other evils in war and in national
and international degeneration. In both law and power, while
these methods for action are permanent in their importance and
application, the present is an especially significant occasion for
their immediate employment.
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